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The trial court erred in ruling that, absent an express 
provision in the lease to the contrary, a lessee is 
presumed to be a coinsured of the lessor, thereby 
barring a subrogation action by the lessor's insurer. 
The lease provision requiring Plaintiffs, as lessor, to 
provide fire insurance did not expressly or impliedly 
exempt Defendant, as lessee, from liability for its own 
negligence by elevating Defendant to the status of an 
implied coinsured under the insurance policy and did 
not bar a subrogation action by Plaintiffs' insurer. . . 
A. The trial court's coinsured ruling is 
contrary to a large body of established law 
and sound public policy 
B. Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease establish 
that Defendant is liable for loss by fire 
caused by its own negligence. Even if those 
Paragraphs are somehow ambiguous, they should 
be construed against Defendant, who 
drafted the lease 
The trial court erred in ruling that the lease does not 
contain an express provision reserving Safeco's right 
of subrogation and in ruling that two particular 
paragraphs in the lease constituted pre-loss releases 
of Safeco's subrogation rights , 
The trial court erred in dismissing all of the 
subrogation claims where some of those claims were 
brought by virtue of insurance policies issued to other 
tenants who were not parties to the lease involving 
Defendant 
ion 9 
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I 
The trial court erred in ruling that, absent 
an express provision in the lease to the 
contrary, a lessee is presumed to be a 
coinsured of the lessor, thereby barring a 
subrogation action by the lessor's insurer. 
The lease provision requiring Plaintiffs, as 
lessor, to provide fire insurance did not 
expressly or impliedly exempt Defendant, as 
lessee, from liability for its own negligence 
by elevating Defendant to the status of an 
implied coinsured under the insurance policy 
and did not bar a subrogation action by 
Plaintiffs' insurer. 
A* The trial court's coinsured ruling is contrary to 
a large body of established law and sound public policy. 
For its principal argument in its Brief, Defendant-
Respondent Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health 
("Defendant) urges this Court to adopt "in toto" the reasoning of 
the Alaska court in Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun., 623 
P2d 1216 (Alaska 1981). (Def Br 13, 25) Defendant, however, 
completely ignores the dispositive Utah law cited by Plaintiffs-
Appellants ("Plaintiffs") in their opening brief (at 9-21) and 
the fact that, as noted in Plaintiffs' opening brief (at 21), the 
decision in Alaska Ins. was a radical and unfounded departure 
from the earlier case law on which it purportedly relied. 
Contrary to the holding in the Alaska Ins. decision, 
the Utah Court has implied that a contract provision requiring 
one party to provide insurance does not absolve the other party 
from liability for its own negligence. In DuBois v. Nye, 584 P2d 
2 
823 (Utah 1978) (App Br 15-16, 20, 24), the Court rejected an 
argument by purchasers/tortfeasors that they were immunized from 
liability for their own negligence because the sellers had agreed 
to procure insurance and had been reimbursed by their insurer. 
The Court stated that the tortfeasors could not escape liability 
on the ground that the sellers had agreed to purchase insurance 
and had been reimbursed by their insurer. 
Defendant also completely ignores Utah case law that 
disfavors a party contracting to protect itself against liability 
for loss caused by its own negligence. In Walker Bank & Trust 
Co. v. First Security Corp.. 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P2d 944 (1959) 
(App Br 10, 16), and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co.. 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P2d 910 (1965) (App Br 11, 
16, 20, 25), the Court held that contracts in which a party 
attempts to protect itself against liability are subject to 
strict construction against that party and, further, that the 
party will not be afforded protection unless the preclusion 
against negligence is clearly and unequivocally stated. That 
position is directly contrary to the reasoning urged by Defendant 
that it is presumed to be immunized from liability for its own 
negligence absent an express provision to the contrary. 
In addition to the decision in Alaska Ins., Defendant 
mentions five cases from other jurisdictions. (Def Br 28-31) 
However, those cases merely adopt, without analysis or 
examination, the decision in Alaska Ins., and, in at least one 
3 
case, involve different redelivery provisions than are present in 
this matter. For example, in Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P2d 688 
(Wash App 1979) (Def Br 31) , the lessee was merely obligated to 
"quit and surrender these said premises in good state and 
condition as they now are (ordinary wear and damage by the 
elements or fire excepted)." 592 P2d at 689. The lease in 
Rizzuto did not contain the crucial language "damage by fire and 
casualty not the fault of LESSEE and damage by elements excepted 
therefrom" that is contained in the lease prepared by Defendant 
in this matter. In addition, the Court in Rizzuto reached its 
decision in part because it believed that the tenant had paid for 
insurance through increased rent. In this matter, the evidence 
clearly shows that Defendant's rent was not adjusted upward and, 
in fact, Defendant dictated the amount of the rent. (App Br 30, 
31; CR 3998, 4004) Moreover, one of the cases relied on by 
Defendant, West American Ins. v. Pic Way Shoes, 313 NW2d 187 
(Mich App 1981), involved no evidence of a redelivery provision 
or an indemnity provision such as are found in this matter. That 
very short opinion contains absolutely no analysis of the issue 
but merely adopts the decision of Alaska Ins.. 
Defendant asserts that the decision in Bd. of Ed. of 
Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Hales, 566 P2d 1246 (Utah 1977), supports 
its position. (Def Br 32) However, in Hales the defendant 
subcontractor was a named insured under the policy taken out by 
the plaintiff. The case contains absolutely no discussion 
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concerning implied coinsurance resulting from an agreement to 
procure insurance. 
B. Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease establish that 
Defendant is liable for loss by fire caused bv its own 
negligence. Even if those Paragraphs are somehow ambiguous, they 
should be construed against Defendant, who drafted the lease. 
In addition, and as discussed in Plaintiffs1 opening 
brief (at 21-24), the trial court's ruling renders meaningless 
the "redelivery" provision (Paragraph 7) and the indemnity 
provision (Paragraph 16) of the lease prepared by Defendant. 
Utah courts have held that, in interpreting a contract, the court 
is to determine the meaning of the contract without adding, 
ignoring or discarding words in the process. Cornwall v. Willow 
Creek Country Club. 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P2d 928, 929 (1962). If, 
as Defendant contends, those contractual provisions are 
meaningless, Defendant's attorney, who prepared the lease, had 
the opportunity not to include them. 
As noted in Plaintiffs' opening brief (at 4, 23, 24-
31), Patricia Marlowe, an attorney with Defendant's County 
Attorneys' Office, prepared and was the sole author of the lease. 
She specifically included Paragraphs 7 and 16. Subsequent to the 
fire, she attempted to state that she did not intend that those 
provisions would result in Defendant's liability for damage 
caused by its own negligence. (Def Br 9-11) But as Defendant 
5 
admits in its Brief (at 23), the law is not concerned with 
undisclosed intentions. Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P2d 
1231 (Utah 1983); Praaaastis v. Sandner, 595 P2d 520 (Or App 
1979) . 
Thus, Defendant's attempts to render meaningless 
Paragraphs 7 and 16 must fail and the post-fire protestations by 
Defendant's attorney that she intended that the provisions meant 
something other than what they clearly state are simply 
irrelevant. Moreover, as set forth in Plaintiffs' opening brief 
(at 24-26) and as the Court stated in Bonneville On The Hill Co. 
v. Sloane, 572 P2d 402 (Utah 1977), any doubt or uncertainty in 
the language of a lease should be strictly construed against the 
party preparing the lease. Defendant's attorney prepared and 
drafted the lease in this matter. At the very least, this Court 
should affirm the initial and correct ruling of the trial court 
(Judge Billings) denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the basis that there is a material issue of fact as to the 
parties' intent at the time the lease was executed. (App Br 26-
31) 
6 
II 
The trial court erred in ruling that the 
lease does not contain an express provision 
reserving Safeco's right of subrogation and 
in ruling that two particular paragraphs in 
the lease constituted pre-loss releases of 
Safeco1s subrogation rights. 
In its Brief (at 33), Defendant contends that it raised 
a new legal theory in its Second Motion for Summary Judgment that 
was not argued in its First Motion for Summary Judgment — that 
Plaintiffs released Defendant from any possibility of a 
subrogation action by agreeing in the lease to provide fire 
insurance. However, that argument is merely a reiteration, under 
another name, of Defendant's implied coinsured argument. 
While, as noted in Plaintiffs' opening brief (at 33), 
the trial court did not cite any authority in ruling in 
Defendant's favor on that theory, Defendant relies on the 
following cases already discussed in Plaintiffs' opening brief in 
support of its so-called "new legal theory": 
In Koennecke v. Waxwina Cedar Products. Ltd.. 543 P2d 
669 (Or 1975) (App Br 33-34), the parties to the lease had orally 
agreed that the lessee would not be responsible for damage to the 
leased property. In this case, however, there was no agreement, 
oral or written, that Defendant would not be responsible for 
damage to the leased property. It is significant that, contrary 
to Defendant's assertions, the Court in Koennecke did not rule 
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that an agreement to provide fire insurance constituted a pre-
loss release. 
Similarly, in Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord 
Mechanical Con. . 406 P2d 556 (Or 1965) (App Br 34), the contract 
between the parties contained an exculpatory provision which 
specifically stated that the contractor would not be held liable 
for certain loss or damage. Again, the Court in that case did 
not rule that an agreement to procure fire insurance by itself 
constituted a pre-loss release. 
Also, in Extaza of 34th Street v. City Stores Co., 467 
NE2d 889 (NY App 1984) (App Br 35), the tenant had given a prior 
written release of liability to the landlord and, based on that 
release, the court held that the tenantfs insurer had no 
subrogation rights. In this matter, Plaintiffs clearly did not 
give Defendant such prior written release. 
Finally, in Insurance Co., Etc. v. Universal Mortg. 
Corp., 262 NW2d 92 (Wis 1978) (App Br 34-35), the lease agreement 
contained specific language exempting the tenant from liability, 
to the extent of insurance proceeds, for damage caused by its 
negligence. The lease agreement in this matter, however, 
contains no such provision. 
None of the cases cited by Defendant support the trial 
court's erroneous ruling that a provision to provide fire 
insurance somehow constitutes a pre-loss release of liability. 
8 
The cases cited by Defendant deal with lease provisions or 
agreements that were not present in this matter. 
Ill 
The trial court erred in dismissing all of 
the subrogation claims where some of those 
claims were brought by virtue of insurance 
policies issued to other tenants who were not 
parties to the lease involving Defendant. 
As discussed in Plaintiffs1 opening brief (at 36-39), 
Defendant's implied coinsured waiver of subrogation theory cannot 
apply to claims that were brought by virtue of insurance policies 
issued to other tenants who were not parties to the lease 
involving Defendant. Safeco should not be precluded from 
bringing subrogation actions based on insurance policies that 
were issued to tenants who were not parties to the lease. 
In its Brief (at 40-43), Defendant erroneously contends that the 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled to the contrary in Bd. of Ed. of 
Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Hales, supra, and Bonneville On The Hill Co. 
v. Sloane, supra. However, the decision in Hales did not deal 
with insurance policies issued to other tenants who were not 
parties to the lease. As previously discussed, that decision 
dealt with one agreement to provide insurance coverage to certain 
contractors and subcontractors. The insurer paid for damage to 
the negligent subcontractor's property under one portion of the 
policy coverage while at the same time attempting to subrogate 
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against the negligent subcontractor on the ground that the 
subcontractor was not insured under the liability coverage of the 
same policy. That is not the case in this matter. Also, unlike 
Hales, Defendant is not a named insured under the insurance 
policy. 
In Bonneville On The Hill, the Court dealt with only 
one insurance policy and a lease agreement that contained a 
redelivery provision exempting the lessee from damage by fire. 
At issue in the Bonneville case was whether the exemption covered 
only the leased apartment or the entire apartment complex. 
However, that type of lease provision is not present in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above and in Plaintiffs' opening brief, 
this Court should reverse the Judgment entered in this matter and 
direct the entry of a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs or, in the 
alternative, remand this matter to the trial court for the 
following reasons: 
1. The trial court's coinsured ruling is contrary to 
a large body of established law and sound public policy that a 
party to a lease should not be immunized from liability for its 
own negligence in the absence of a clear and unequivocal 
contractual provision in the lease; 
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2. Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease drafted by 
Defendant's attorney establish that Defendant is liable for loss 
by fire caused by its own negligence; 
3. Even if the lease is somehow ambiguous as to 
whether Defendant is liable for loss by fire caused by its own 
negligence, any ambiguity must be construed against Defendant, 
who drafted the lease. Alternatively, there is at least a 
material issue of fact as to the parties' intent at the time the 
lease was executed; 
4. The trial court erred in ruling that Paragraphs 9 
and 19 of the lease constitute pre-loss releases of Safeco's 
subrogation rights; and 
5. The trial court erred in dismissing all of the 
subrogation claims because the implied coinsured waiver of 
subrogation theory cannot apply to claims that are brought by 
11 
virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants who were not 
parties to the lease involving Defendant. 
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